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Abstract. This chapter draws attention to a speciﬁc feature of a NEG
model that uses linear (and not iso-elastic) demand functions, namely its
ability to account for zero trade. Thus, it represents a suitable framework
to study how changes in parameters that are typical for NEG models,
such as trade costs and regional market size, not only shape the regional
distribution of economic activity, but at the same time determine the
emergence of additional trade links between formerly autarkic regions.
We survey some related papers and present a three-region framework
that potentially nests many possible trade patterns. To focus the analy-
sis, we study in more detail three speciﬁc trade patterns frequently found
in the EU trade network. We start with three autarkic regions; then we
introduce the possibility that two regions trade with each other; and,
ﬁnally, we allow for one region trading with the other two, but the lat-
ter are still not trading with each other. We ﬁnd a surprising plethora
of long-run equilibria each involving a speciﬁc regional distribution of
economic activity and a speciﬁc pattern of trade links. We show how a
reduction in trade costs shapes simultaneously industry location and the
conﬁguration of the trade network.
Keywords: Two-dimensional piecewise smooth map · Multistability ·
Basin of attraction · New Economic Geography model · Three-region
models · Trade patterns
1 Introduction
In this chapter, we address the questions of what determines the creation of trade
links between regions, and their direction, and how the presence of a trade link
may interfere with the distribution of the manufacturing activity across space.
Indeed, it easy to infer that the presence of a trade link may aﬀect the processes
of agglomeration or dispersion of such activity and, in turn, the degree of spatial
concentration of industry has a bearing on the formation of trade links by increas-
ing/reducing the accessibility of a region for outside ﬁrms. As is well-known, the
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interplay between agglomeration and dispersion forces and how it shapes the
spatial economic landscape is at the core of the new economic geography (NEG)
literature.
The NEG approach, originating from Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman
and Venables (1999) (see Baldwin et al. (2003), for a review), aims to explain
what determines the distribution of industrial activities across space. Its main
building blocks are Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, increasing returns,
CES preferences over industrial varieties and isoelastic demands, multiplica-
tive/iceberg trade costs and a dynamic mechanism based on factor migration (for
example, in Krugman’s seminal Core-Periphery model, this factor is undiﬀerenti-
ated labour; NEG model variants consider other factors such as physical capital
or skilled workers/entrepreneurs). Mainly dealing with two-region economies, the
predictions of NEG models depend on the balance between agglomeration and
dispersion forces. Most NEG models involve two forces, related to market access
and consumers’ prices, that have agglomeration eﬀects; and a third force, related
to local competition, that has a dispersion eﬀect. Which of these forces domi-
nate, depends on trade costs: in a standard NEG set-up, high trade costs favours
dispersion and low trade costs agglomeration. At intermediate trade costs, long-
term dispersion or agglomeration of the industry may prevail, depending on its
initial distribution of this sector between the regions. In the analytic perspec-
tive, this translates into coexistence of dispersion and agglomeration equilibria.
A slight change in the initial distribution of economic activities may induce a
catastrophic change from dispersion to agglomeration, switching from an equilib-
rium to another with completely diﬀerent properties. For the present question it
is important to note that – given the speciﬁc model set-up – ﬁrms always export,
except when trade costs are inﬁnite. This implication is at odds with empirical
observations, where ﬁnding zero trade is quite common.
Ottaviano et al. (2002) propose an alternative model in which ﬁrms may not
export even when trade costs are ﬁnite. Their model set up involves quadratic
preferences, implying a linear demand (elasticity depends on prices and market
fundamentals), segmented markets and additive trade costs. In Ottaviano et al.
(2002) the local competition eﬀect is reinforced by a variable mark-up. In a
two-region framework, they show the following results: high trade costs imply
dispersion; low trade costs imply agglomeration; and after a speciﬁc threshold
for trade costs the economy may experience an abrupt change from dispersion to
agglomeration. However, there is no coexistence of dispersion and agglomeration
stable equilibria. Notice that Ottaviano et al. (2002) assume that trade costs are
always suﬃciently low to allow for bilateral trade between the regions.
Within the same framework, Behrens (2004) examines the opposite case by
assuming trade costs suﬃciently high that interregional trade never occurs. This
author shows that even when regions are fully autarkic, agglomeration is still
possible. Depending on the size of the immobile demand (ﬁxing the size of the
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demand that could shift),1 dispersion, agglomeration or partial agglomeration
are possible long-run outcomes. A large immobile local demand reinforces the
dispersion forces and higher prices in autarky weakens the agglomeration ones,
so that stable coexisting partial agglomeration equilibria are possible. More-
over, by reducing the size of immobile demand a smooth process from dispersion
to agglomeration takes place. In a later paper, Behrens (2005) examines the
case of intermediate trade costs, showing that, depending on the initial indus-
try distribution across space and on trade costs, diﬀerent trade patterns may
emerge between two regions: autarky, unilateral or bilateral trade (alternatively,
no trade, one-way trade or two-way trade). This author addresses also the inter-
play between patterns of trade and of regional distribution of economic activity.
He shows that unilateral trade favours agglomeration forces over dispersion forces
leading to the concentration of industry in the region that, in an initial stage,
has the larger share of industry.2
Ago et al. (2006) consider an economy where three regions takes a speciﬁc
hub-and-spoke conﬁguration: they are aligned with the central region positioned
at the same distance from the two peripheral ones. Dealing with the case of
linear demand,3 the authors show that in an economy with an intermediate size
of the manufacturing a reduction in trade costs intially leads to a reduction
in the share of the mobile factor located in the central region; subsequently, it
leads to an increase; ﬁnally, when trade costs are suﬃciently low, the mobile
factor is fully agglomerated in the central region. Instead, when the size of the
manufacturing sector (shifting demand) is relatively large compared to the agri-
cultural sector (immobile demand) by reducing trade costs the share of industry
in the central region shrinks and the mobile factor moves to the peripheral ones
(ﬁnally agglomerating in one of them). In the linear framework, the competi-
tion eﬀect is more intense, thus, ﬁrms have a move to the peripheral regions to
1 More speciﬁcally, Behrens (2004) considers the size of the immobile factor, agricul-
tural workers. However, taking into account that agricultural workers receive the
same wage independently of their location, in our discussion we can safely refer to
these agents demand.
2 Okubo et al. (2014) consider the emergence of diﬀerent trade patterns between two
regions with diﬀerent exogenous population sizes. They assume that the mobile
factor is physical capital (separated from owner), this eliminates the agglomeration
self-reinforcing eﬀect linked to demand shifting.
3 Indeed the main purpose of Ago et al. (2006) paper is to compare the two alternative
NEG approaches. Their main conclusion is that moving from autarky to trade, the
central region enjoys a locational advantage in the CES framework; whereas, in the
linear demand framework, the apparently better location translates into a second
nature disadvantage due to enhanced competition.
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protect themselves from such competition.4 Moreover, conﬁning their analysis
to a neighbourhood of the symmetric equilibrium, Ago et al. (2006) shows what
patterns of trade may emerge, following a reduction in trade costs, given the
speciﬁc geography assumed.
Finally, Commendatore et al. (2017) consider a three-region developing econ-
omy with poor infrastructure. A speciﬁc geography is assumed: two regions are
relatively close to each other, whereas the third one is remote and diﬃcult to
access. Two stages of development are considered: in the ﬁrst stage trade costs
are so high that none of the regions trade; in the second stage, the ﬁrst two
regions improve their integration by lowering trade costs. Depending on the
degree of integration and on the distribution of the industrial activity across the
regions, diﬀerent trade patterns may emerge (no trade, one-way trade or two
way trade), but they only involve the two more integrated regions.
In this chapter we extend and/or integrate these contributions. We repre-
sent a small trade network, formed by three regions, aiming to: (i) highlight
how distance and trade costs may determine the existence of a trade link and
its direction; (ii) examine the long-term consequences of trade integration on
the emergence/disappearance of trade links and on the distribution of economic
activities across space; (iii) explore how the spatial distribution of economic
activities and the presence/absence of trade links are interrelated. Given the
large number of possible trade structures, we only consider three examples, rep-
resenting three frequently realized trade patterns in the EU trade network (see
Basile et al. (2016)): three regions in autarky; two regions engaging in trade with
each other, with a third region in autarky; a hub and spoke economy but with
a diﬀerent structure from that suggested by Ago et al. (2006).
We structure the paper as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the basic economic
framework, introducing three examples modelling trade network structures fre-
quently realized in real world economies. In Sect. 3, we presents the short-run
equilibrium solutions for these models. In Sect. 4, we move on to the discussion
of the properties of the long-run equilibria and their economic interpretation.
Section 5 concludes.
4 We found few other contributions dealing with multiregional economies which
employes Ottaviano et al. (2002) framework. Behrens (2011) and Commendatore
et al. (2016) consider a two-country 3-region model where factor migration is lim-
ited to the two regions belonging to the same country. Tabuchi et al. (2005) focus
on cities rather than regions, allowing for “urban costs”. Moreover, they do not
study the emerging of diﬀerent trade patterns (ﬁrms export to any city). Finally,
Furusawa and Konishi (2007) explore the formation of free trade networks. They
assume a given distribution of the industrial activity (conﬁning their analysis to the
short-run) and, in a network formation game setting, show how trade agreements
are formed.
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2 The Model
2.1 Basic Set-Up
The economy is composed of three regions (labelled r = 1, 2, 3) distributed asym-
metrically across space; two sectors, Agriculture (A) and manufacturing (M).
The ﬁrst characterized by perfect competition, constant returns and production
of a homogeneous good and the second by monopolistic competition, increas-
ing returns and production of a diﬀerentiated good; two factors of production,
unskilled labour or simply labour (L) and skilled labour or entrepreneurial activ-
ity (E). Regions have the same endowment of labour. Workers are immobile,
whereas entrepreneurs are allowed to migrate across regions.
2.2 Production
In the A-sector one unit of labour gives one unit of output. In the M -sector
production requires use of one entrepreneur as ﬁxed component plus η units of
labour for each additional unit of output. The total cost of production (TC)
corresponds to:
TC = πi + wηqi,
where πi represents the operating proﬁts and the remuneration of an entre-
preneur, w the wage rate, η the labour input requirement and qi the quantity
produced of variety i.
Due to increasing returns and absence of economies of scope, each ﬁrm pro-
duces a single variety. Following the assumption that only one entrepreneur is
required to activate production, the number of entrepreneurs (E) is equal to the
number of ﬁrms and to the number of varieties (N). Denoting by Λr the share
of entrepreneurs located in region r, the number of varieties produced in that
region is:
Nr = λrN = λrE,
where 0 ≤ λr ≤ 1,
3∑
r=1
λr = 1 and r = 1, 2, 3.
2.3 Utility
The representative consumer’s (unskilled or entrepreneur) preferences are quasi-
linear (see Ottaviano et al. 2002), composed of a quadratic part deﬁning the
choice across the n varieties of the M -good and a linear component for the
consumption of the A-good:
U = α
n∑
i=1
ci −
(
β − δ
2
) N∑
i=1
c2i −
δ
2
(
N∑
i=1
ci
)2
+ CA (1)
where ci is the consumption of variety i and CA the consumption of the agricul-
tural good. The parameters are interpreted as follows: α > 0 is the intensity of
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preference over the M -varieties, δ > 0 the degree of substitutability across those
varieties and the diﬀerence β − δ measures the taste for variety; where α > 0
and β > δ > 0.
The budget constraint is
n∑
i=1
pici + pACA = y + pACA (2)
where pi is the price of variety i including trade costs, pA is the price of the agricul-
tural good, y is the consumer’s income andCA is her endowment of the agricultural
good, suﬃciently large to allow for positive consumption in equilibrium.
2.4 Trade Costs
The cost of trading varieties of the M -good from r to s (or in the opposite
direction from s to r) is Trs (= Tsr); Trs > 0 for r = s and Trr = 0, with
r = 1, 2, 3. Trade costs separate the regions. Diﬀerent combinations are possible,
we will consider here three examples and leave to future research more general
cases:
1. In the ﬁrst example, all regions are in autarky: we assume that trade cost are
suﬃciently high that no trade can occur between the regions, independently
of other factors (esp. the distribution of the economic activity across the
regions). In this example, we assume that the cost of trading the M -varieties
is very large and, for the sake of simplicity, it is the same for all the regions:
T12 = T13 = T23 = T  0. The speciﬁc value that T should take will be
detailed below.
2. In the second example, only regions 1 and 2 may trade with each other, while
region 3 is still in autarky. In this example, we assume T12 = T − ε and
T13 = T23 = T , where 0 < ε < T (this implies T12 < T13 = T23). One-way
trade from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 1 or two-way trade between 1 and 2 can occur
for ε suﬃciently close to T .
3. In the third example, the three regions are positioned along a ‘Hub and spoke’
structure. Region 1 is the central and regions 2 and 3 are peripheral. In
this example, we consider a special case: trade costs between region 1 and
2 and so small that these two regions are always engaged in bilateral trade
independently of other factors (esp. the distribution of the economic activity
across space); region 1 and 3 may trade as well; whereas no trade between 2
and 3 can occur. With respect to the other two examples, region 3 is getting
closer to region 1 but is still too far from region 2. In this example, we
assume T12 = τ , T13 = and T23 = T , where 0 < ψ < T and where τ is
suﬃciently small to allow always for two-way trade between 1 and 2 (this
implies T12 = τ ≤ T − ψ < T ). The speciﬁc value that τ should take will be
detailed below. One-way trade from 1 to 3 or from 3 to 1 or two-way trade
between 1 and 2 can occur for ε suﬃciently close to T .
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3 Short-Run Equilibrium
In a short-run equilibrium, the distribution of entrepreneurs across space is given.
All markets are in equilibrium. We choose the agricultural good as the numeraire.
From perfect competition in the A-sector, it follows: pA = w = 1.
To determine the short-run equilibrium solutions related to the M -sector, we
proceed as follows.
Maximizing the utility (1) subject to the constraint (2), we obtain the ﬁrst
order conditions for i = 1, ...N :
∂U
∂ci
= α − (β − δ)ci − δ
N∑
i=1
ci − pi = 0
from which
pi = α − (β − δ)ci − δ
N∑
i=1
ci .
Solving this system for ci, we obtain the individual linear demand function for
each variety i:
ci = max[0, a − (b + cN)pi + cP ] (3)
where P =
N∑
i=1
pi is the price index and
a =
α
(N − 1)δ + β , b =
1
(N − 1)δ + β , c =
δ
(β − γ)[(N − 1)δ + β] .
Moreover, ci > 0 for pi < p˜i = a+cPb+cN , p˜i representing the cut-oﬀ price below
which demand for variety i is positive.
The representative consumer’s indirect utility corresponds to
V = S + y + CA
where S is the consumer’s surplus:
S = U −
N∑
i=1
pici − CA = a
2N
2b
+
b + cN
2
N∑
i=1
p2i − aP −
c
2
P 2
The consumer’s demand originating from region s(= 1, 2, 3) for a good pro-
duced in region r(= 1, 2, 3), dropping the subscript i because of symmetric ﬁrm
behaviour, is:
crs = max [0, a − (b + cN)prs + cPs]
where prs is the price of a good produced in region r and consumed in region s;
and
Ps =
3∑
k=1
Nkpks =
3∑
k=1
λkEpks (4)
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is the price index in region s(= 1, 2, 3). As before crs > 0 if and only if prs < p˜r =
a+cPs
b+cN , where p˜r is the cut-oﬀ price above which demand is positive (r, s = 1, 2, 3).
Taking into account that L1 = L2 = L3 = L3 , with segmented markets, the
operating proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in r(= 1, 2, 3) is:
πr =
3∑
s=1
(prs − η − Trs)qrs
(
L
3
+ λsE
)
(5)
In a short-run equilibrium, demand is equal to supply in each segmented
market s(= 1, 2, 3): qrs = crs. From proﬁt maximization, recalling that N = E
and that ﬁrms consider the price index as given, the ﬁrst order conditions for
r, s = 1, 2, 3 follow:
∂πr
∂prs
= [a + (η + Trs)(b + cE) + cPs − 2prs(b + cE)]
(
L
3
+ λsE
)
= 0
Taking into account trade costs and letting p˜r > η for r = 1, 2, 3, to allow for
positive production in the local market, proﬁt maximizing prices correspond to:
prr =
a + cPr + η(b + cE)
2(b + cE)
=
1
2
(p˜r + η) (6)
which is the price that ﬁrms quote in the market where they are located; and to
prs =
{
a+cPs+(η+Trs)(b+cE)
2(b+cE) =
1
2 (p˜s + η + Trs) if Trs < p˜s − η
p˜s if Trs ≥ p˜s − η
(7)
which is the price that a ﬁrm located in region r quotes in region s, with r, s =
1, 2, 3 and r = s.
Using the demand and the price functions, we can write:
qrr = (b + cE)(prr − η) (8)
which is the quantity sold in the local market; and
qrs =
{
(b + cE)(prs − η − Trs) if Trs < p˜s − η
0 if Trs ≥ p˜s − η (9)
which is the quantity that a ﬁrm located in region r sells in region s, with
r, s = 1, 2, 3 and r = s.
According to (7) and (9), if a ﬁrm located in r quotes in the market s a price
larger than the reservation price consumers living in s are prepared to pay, the
export from region r to region s is zero. The boundary conditions for trade, as
reported in these expressions, are crucial in the following analysis to determine
the patterns of trade between the regions.
The indirect utility for a r-entrepreneur is
Vr = Sr + πr + CA
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where
πr =
3∑
s=1
(prs − η − Trs)qrs
(
L
3
+ λsE
)
is the equilibrium proﬁt for a r-ﬁrm, and
Sr =
a2E
2b
+
b + cE
2
3∑
s=1
λsEp
2
sr − aPr −
c
2
P 2 (10)
is the consumer’s surplus of the entrepreneur.
3.1 Short-Run Solutions
3.1.1 Model 1. All Autarkic Regions
In this set-up, we assume that the three regions are equidistant, with T12 = T13 =
T23 = T and suﬃciently far away in terms of trade costs that trade cannot take
place for any of the possible distributions of economic activity. When no region
is trading, the condition Trs ≥ p˜s − η holds for all r,s, with r, s = 1, 2, 3 and
r = s. It corresponds to:
Trs = T ≥ p˜s − η = 2(a − ηb)2b + cλsE .
This expression can be alternatively written as
λs ≥ 2(a − ηb − bT )
cET
= λ.
No trade occurs for any distribution of the economic activity across the
regions when:
T ≥ a
b
− η or λ ≤ 0,
which is what we assume in the ﬁrst set-up.5
From (4)–(9), taking into account the linear demand non-negativity con-
straint, we derive the equilibrium short-run proﬁt for a ﬁrm located in region r,
which sells in the local market6:
πr = πnor = (p
no
rr − η)2(b + cE)
(
L
3
+ λrE
)
= πnorr
Finally, taking also into account (10), we obtain the indirect utility of entre-
preneur resident in r:
Vr = V nor = S
no
r + π
no
r + CA = S
no
r + π
no
rr + CA.
5 For convenience, in the simulations we assume T = a
b
− η corresponding to the
minimum value of trade costs which ensures no trade for any distribution of the
industrial activity between the regions, λr.
6 More details on the short-run equilibrium solutions for the ﬁrst and the second model
can be found in Commendatore et al. (2017).
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3.1.2 Model 2. Allowing Trade only Between Regions 1 and 2
In the second set-up, trade costs between regions 1 and 2 are reduced, so that
trade between these two regions can take place. We assume T12 = T − ε, where
0 < ε ≤ T ,7 then trade may occur when ε is suﬃciently close to T . We also
assume T13 = T23 = T ≥ ab − η so that trade between regions 1 and 2 as well as
2 and 3 is still too costly leaving region 3 in autarky.
There are four diﬀerent scenarios depending on the ‘trade distance’ between
regions 1 and 2, that is on ε.
In the ﬁrst scenario, regions 1 and 2 still do not trade with each other: from
(4), (6), and (7), the condition of no trade Trs ≥ p˜s − η for r, s = 1, 2 and r = s
corresponds to:
Trs = T − ε ≥ 2(a − ηb)2b + cλsE
This expression can alternatively be expressed as:
λr ≥ λ˜ for r = 1, 2
where λ˜ = 2(a−ηb−bT+εb)cE(T−ε) .
The same results as before apply, thus the equilibrium short-run proﬁt for a
ﬁrm located in region r is πr = πnor and the indirect utility of an entrepreneur
resident in r is Vr = V nor .
In the second and third scenarios, unilateral or one-way trade occurs (from 1
to 2 in the second and from 2 to 1 in the third scenario). We consider these two
scenarios together. We have that Trs < p˜s−η and Trs ≥ p˜s−η holds for r, s = 1, 2
and r = s (i.e. for r = 1 and s = 2 in the second and for r = 2 and s = 1 in the
third scenario). From (4), (6), and (7), the conditions for unidirectional trade
from r to s are obtained:
Trs = T − ε < 2(a − ηb)2b + cλsE and Trs = T − ε ≥
2(a − ηb)
2b + cλrE
or, alternatively:
λ˜ ≥ λr and λ˜ < λs
with r = 1 and s = 2 in the second and r = 2 and s = 1 in the third scenario.
Letting r = 1 and s = 2 for the second and r = 2 and s = 1 for the third
scenario and k = 3 in both, from (4)–(9), the equilibrium short-run proﬁts for
the case of one-way trade from r to s are:
πr = πoutr = (b + cE)
[
(pnorr − η)2
(
L
3
+ λrE
)
+ (poutrs − η − Trs)2
(
L
3
+ λsE
)]
= πnorr + π
out
rs
7 When ε = 0 , T12 = T and we are back to the previous set up. As before, in the
simulation we ﬁx T = a
b
− η.
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πs = πins = (b + cE)(p
in
ss − η)2
(
L
3
+ λsE
)
= πinss
πk = πnok
where πoutr is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in r which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part πnorr is obtained by selling in the local market, which is not aﬀected
by its exports to s due to market segmentation, and the second part πoutrs by
selling in s; πins is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in s obtained only by selling in the
local market, which is aﬀected by the competition from the ﬁrms located in r;
and πnok is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in k obtained only by selling in the local
market, which is not aﬀected by competition from outside.
Finally, taking also into account (10), the indirect utilities for the case of
one-way trade from r to s are:
Vr = V outr = S
out
r + π
out
rr + CA = S
no
r + π
out
rr + CA
Vs = V ins = S
in
s + π
in
s + CA = S
in
s + π
in
ss + CA
Vk = V nok
where V outr is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in r, whose proﬁts
are higher compared to autarky; V inr is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur
located in s, whose proﬁts are lower and the surplus, Sins , is higher compared to
autarky; and V nok is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in k, which is
the same as in the previous model.
In the fourth scenario bilateral or two-way trade occurs. In this scenario
Trs < p˜s − η for r, s = 1, 2 and r = s. From (4), (6), and (7), the conditions for
unilateral trade between r and s are:
Trs = T − ε < 2(a − ηb)2b + cλsE for r = 1, 2 and r = s,
or, alternatively,
λr < λ˜ for r = 1, 2
From (4)–(9), the equilibrium proﬁts for the case of bilateral trade between
r and s are:
πr = πbilr = π
bil
rr + π
bil
rs for r = 1, 2 and r = s
πk = πnok for k = 3
where πbilr is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in r, which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part πbilrr is obtained by selling in the local market, which is not aﬀected
by its export towards s but is aﬀected by competition from the ﬁrms located in
s and the second part πbilrs by selling in s, with r = 1, 2 and r = s; and πnok , with
k = 3, is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in k, which has the same meaning as before.
Finally, taking also into account 10, the indirect utilities for the case of two-
way trade between r and s are:
Vr = V
bil
r = S
bil
r + π
bil
r + CA = S
bil
r + π
bil
rr + π
bil
rs + CA for r = 1, 2 and r = s
Vk = V
no
k for k = 3
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where V bilr is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in r. Even though her
proﬁts originated from the local market πbilrr are lower due to competition from
ﬁrms located in s, she is enjoying proﬁts by selling in region s, πbilrs . Moreover,
her surplus, Sbilr , is higher compared to when only local goods are available for
consumption, with r = 1, 2 and r = s. As before, the indirect utility of an
entrepreneur located in k is not changed, with k = 3.
3.1.3 Model 3. Hub and Spoke
In the third set-up, region 1 may trade with regions 2 and 3 but regions 2
and 3 do not trade with each other. We consider a special case of an ‘hub and
spoke’ structure: that is, we assume that trade costs between regions 1 and 2 are
suﬃciently low that bilateral trade between these two regions always occur, that
is, we set T12 = τ <
2(a−ηb)
2b+cE . We also assume prohibitive trade costs between 2
and 3:
T23 = T ≥ a
b
− η
Moreover, letting T13 = T − ψ and considering that T12 ≤ T13 ≤ T23, we have
that τ ≤ T − ψ ≤ T .
There are four possible scenarios, depending on ψ. In the ﬁrst scenario, no
trade between regions 1 and 3 occurs: Trk ≥ p˜k − η for r, k = 1, 3 and r = k.
From (4), (6), and (7), the condition corresponding to no trade between 1 and
3 corresponds to:
T13 = T − ψ ≥ max
(
2(a − ηb) + cEλ2T12
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
,
2(a − ηb)
2b + cλ3E
)
or to
λ1 ≥ λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2 and λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1
where λ = 2(a−ηb−bT13)cET13 =
2(a−ηb−bT+ψb)
cET13
.
The equilibrium proﬁts and indirect utilities correspond to those in the fourth
scenario of the second set-up. These are: πr = πbilr , πk = π
no
k , Vr = V
bil
r and
Vk = V nok for r = 1, 2, r = s and k = 3.
In the second and third scenarios. Unilateral trade occurs involving region
1 and 3 (from 1 to 3 in the second and from 3 to 1 in the third scenario). We
consider these two scenarios together. We have that Trk < p˜k−η and Trk ≥ p˜r−η
holds for r, k = 1, 3 and r = k (i.e. for r = 1 and k = 3 in the second and for
r = 3 and k = 1 in the third scenario).
From (4), (6), and (7), one-way trade from region 1 to region 3 occurs when:
2(a − ηb) + cEλ2T12
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
≤ T13 = T − ψ < 2(a − ηb)2b + cλ3E
or when
λ1 ≥ λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2 and λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1
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The short-run equilibrium proﬁts for the case of one-way trade from region
1 to region 3 are:8
π1 = π
bil, out
1 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil11 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pbil12 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)
+
+ (pout13 − η − T13)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)]
= πbil1 + π
out
13
π2 = π
bil, out
2 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil21 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pbil22 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)]
= πbil2
π3 = π
bil, out
3 = (b + cE)(p
bil, out
33 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)
= πbil, out33
where πbil, out1 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 1 which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part corresponds to the proﬁt obtained in the absence of the trade link
from 1 to 3 πbil1 – which is itself composed of two parts (see above) – and the
second part πout13 is obtained by selling in 3, which is not aﬀected by its exports
to 3 due to market segmentation; πbil, out2 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in region
2 which is equal to that in the fourth scenario of the second set-up; and πbil, out3
is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 3 obtained only by selling in the local market,
which is aﬀected by the competition from the ﬁrms located in 1.
Finally, taking also into account (10), the indirect utilities for the case of
one-way trade from region 1 to region 3 correspond to:
V1 = V
bil, out
1 = V
bil
1 + π
out
13
V2 = V
bil, out
2 = V
bil
2
V3 = V
bil, out
3 = V
in
3 = S
in
3 + π
in
33 + CA
where V bil, out1 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 1, whose proﬁts
are higher compared to the case when there are no trade links between 1 and 3;
V bil, out2 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 2, which the same
that the one obtained in the fourth scenario of the second set-up; and V bil, out3
is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 3, whose proﬁts are lower
and the surplus Sin3 is higher compared to the case of no trade links between 1
and 3.
From (4), (6), and (7), one-way trade from region 3 to region 1 occurs when:
2(a − ηb)
2b + cλ3E
≤ T13 = T − ψ < 2(a − ηb) + cEλ2T122b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
or when
λ1 < λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2 and λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1.
8 More details on the short-run equilibrium solutions for this model can be found in
the Appendix.
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The short-run equilibrium proﬁts for the case of one-way trade from region
3 to region 1 are:
π1 = π
bil, in
1 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in11 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pout12 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)]
= πbil, in11 + π
out
12
π2 = π
bil, in
2 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in21 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pout22 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)]
= πbil, in21 + π
out
22
π3 = π
bil, in
3 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in31 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pno33 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)]
= πbil, in31 + π
no
33
where πbil, in1 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 1 which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part πbil, in11 is obtained by selling in the local market, which is not
aﬀected by its exports towards 2 but is aﬀected by the competition from the
ﬁrms located both in 2 and in 3 and the second part πout12 by selling in 2; π
bil, in
2
is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in region 2 which is composed of two parts: the
ﬁrst part πbil, in21 is obtained by selling in 1 which is aﬀected by the competition
in that market not only from the local ﬁrms but also from the ﬁrms located
in 3 and the second part πbil22 obtained by selling in the local market, which is
not aﬀected by the exports towards 1 but it is aﬀected by competition from the
ﬁrms located in 1; and πbil, in3 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 3 composed of
two parts: the ﬁrst part πbil, in31 is obtained by selling in 1, which is aﬀected by
the competition in that market not only from the local ﬁrms but also from the
ﬁrms located in 2 and the second part πno33 , which is not aﬀected by the exports
towards 1.
Taking also into account (10), the indirect utilities for the case of one-way
trade from region 3 to region 1 corresponds to:
V1 = V
bil, in
1 = S
bil, in
1 + π
bil, in
1 + CA
V2 = V
bil, in
2 = S
bil
2 + π
bil, in
2 + CA
V3 = V
bil, in
3 = S
no
3 + π
bil, in
31 + CA
where V bil, in1 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 1, whose proﬁts
are lower and surplus is higher compared to when there are no trade links between
1 and 3; V bil, in2 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 2, whose
proﬁts are lower compared to when there are no trade links between 1 and 3;
and V bil, in3 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 3, whose proﬁts
are higher compared to the case of no trade links between 1 and 3.
Finally, in the fourth scenario bilateral trade between regions 1 and 3 occurs.
We have that Trk < p˜k − η for r, k = 1, 3 and r = k. From (4), (6), and (7),
bilateral trade between regions 1 and 3 occurs when:
T13 = T − ψ < min
(
2(a − ηb) + cEλ2T12
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
,
2(a − ηb)
2b + cλ3E
)
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or when
λ1 < λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2 and λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1.
The short-run equilibrium proﬁts for the case of bilateral trade between
regions 1 and 3 are:
π1 = π
bil, bil
1 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in11 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pout12 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)
+ (pout13 − η − T13)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)]
= πbil, in1 + π
out
13
π2 = π
bil, bil
2 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in21 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pout22 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)]
= πbil, in2
π3 = π
bil, bil
3 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in31 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pbil, out33 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)]
= πbil, in31 + π
bil, out
33
where πbil, bil1 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 1 which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part πbil, in1 is what is obtained in the third scenario and the second
part πout13 by selling in 3; π
bil, bil
2 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in region 2 which
is the same as in the third scenario; and πbil, bil3 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 3
composed of two parts: the ﬁrst part πbil, in31 is obtained by selling in 1, which is
aﬀected by the competition in that market not only from the local ﬁrms but also
from the ﬁrms located in 2 and the second part πbil, out33 is obtained by selling
in the local market, which is aﬀected by the competition from the ﬁrms located
in 1.
Finally, taking also into account (10), the indirect utilities for the case of
bilateral trade between 1 and 3 correspond to:
V1 = V
bil, bil
1 = V
bil, in
1 + π
out
13
V2 = V
bil, bil
2 = V
bil, in
2
V3 = V
bil, bil
3 = V
bil, out
3 + π
bil, in
31
where V bil, bil1 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 1, which is equal
to the indirect utility enjoyed in the third scenario plus the proﬁts obtained by
selling in 3; V bil, bil2 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 2, which
is the same as in the third scenario; and V bil, bil3 is the indirect utility of an
entrepreneur located in 3, which is equal to that enjoyed in the second scenario
plus the proﬁts obtained by selling in 1.
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4 Definition of the Basic Dynamic Equations
The dynamics of the three NEG model variants presented above is described by
a two-dimensional (2D) system of diﬀerence equations, or map, Z:
Z :
(
λ1
λ2
)
→
(
Z1(λ1, λ2)
Z2(λ1, λ2)
)
, (11)
where
Zi(λ1, λ2) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if Fi ≤ 0,
Fi if Fi > 0, Fj > 0, Fi + Fj < 1,
Fi
Fi + Fj
if Fi > 0, Fj > 0, Fi + Fj ≥ 1,
Fi
1 − Fj if Fi > 0, Fj ≤ 0, Fi + Fj < 1,
1 if Fi > 0, Fj ≤ 0, Fi + Fj ≥ 1,
with i = 1, j = 2 for Z1(λ1, λ2) and i = 2, j = 1 for Z2(λ1, λ2) ,
Fr(λ1, λ2) = λr(1 + γΩr(λ1, λ2)), r = 1, 2 ,
Ωr(λ1, λ2) =
Vr(λ1, λ2)
λ1V1(λ1, λ2) + λ2V2(λ1, λ2) + (1 − λ1 − λ2)V3(λ1, λ2) − 1.
Due to the constraint on the regional shares of entrepreneurs, the map Z is piece-
wise smooth. In Z, the indirect utilities Vi(λ1, λ2), i = 1, 2, 3, of an entrepreneur
in regions 1, 2 and 3, respectively, are deﬁned according to the assumptions of
the considered models.
Independently on the speciﬁcation of the indirect utilities the following prop-
erties hold:
• All the relevant dynamics in the (λ1, λ2)-phase plane is trapped in a triangle
denoted S, whose borders:
Ib1 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ2 = 0}, Ib2 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ1 = 0}, Ib3 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ2 = 1 − λ1}
(12)
are invariant lines9 of map Z.
• A ﬁxed point of the map Z, which lies inside S, corresponds to a stationary
long-run equilbrium of the economy; the vertices of S are Core-periphery
(CP ) ﬁxed points/equilibria:
CP0 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, 0), CP1 : (λ1, λ2) = (1, 0), CP2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, 1), (13)
characterised by full spatial agglomeration of the industrial activity, with all
the entrepreneurs located in only one region.
• Any interior fixed point of Z, if it exists, is given by intersection of the curves
Ω1 = {(λ1, λ2) : Ω1(λ1, λ2) = 0} and Ω2 = {(λ1, λ2) : Ω2(λ1, λ2) = 0}. (14)
An interior (symmetric or asymmetric) equilibrium is characterised by posi-
tive shares of entrepreneurs in all regions (which can be equal or diﬀerent).
9 Recall that a set A is called invariant under a map F if F (A) = A.
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• Any border fixed point belonging to Ibi, i = 1, 2, if it exists, is an intersec-
tion point of Ωi and Ibi, while any border ﬁxed point belonging to Ib3 is an
intersection point of Ω1, Ω2 and Ib3. A border (symmetric or asymmetric)
equilibrium is characterised by positive shares of entrepreneurs in two regions
and no entrepreneurs in the third one. In the regions where entrepreneurs are
present they can be equally distributed (in a border symmetric equilibrium)
or unevenly distributed (in a border asymmetric equilibrium).
5 Long-Run Equilibria Properties in Model 1
Under the assumptions associated with Model 1 (when all the regions are in
autarky) the indirect utilities of an entrepreneur in regions 1, 2 and 3, respec-
tively, correspond to:
Vr(λr) = V nor (λr) , r = 1, 2 , (15)
V3(λ1, λ2) = V no3 (λ1, λ2) . (16)
and are deﬁned in Commendatore et al. (2017). This case generalizes the model
studied in Behrens (2004), where two regions in full autarky are considered. We
have examined in full detail the mathematical properties of the system (15)–
(16) in Commendatore et al. (2017). In this paper, we will focus more on the
economic meaning of some results.
First note that for Model 1 not only the borders of the trapping triangle S
but also its medians:
Im1 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ2 = 1 − 2λ1}, Im2 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ1 = 1 − 2λ2},
Im3 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ1 = λ2},
are invariant lines of map Z.
Besides the Core-periphery equilibria (see (13)), Model 1 can have also bor-
der symmetric/asymmetric equilibria, as well as interior symmetric/asymmetric
equilibria.
In the ﬁrst place, border symmetric (BS) equilibria always exist:
BS1 : (λ1, λ2) = (1/2, 0), BS2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, 1/2), BS3 : (λ1, λ2) = (1/2, 1/2) .
Considering the border asymmetric (BA) equilibria
BA1 : (λ1, λ2) = (p, 0) ∈ Ib1 , BA′1 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − p, 0) ∈ Ib1,
BA2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, p) ∈ Ib2 , BA′2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, 1 − p) ∈ Ib2,
BA3 : (λ1, λ2) = (p, 1 − p) ∈ Ib3 , BA′3 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − p, p) ∈ Ib3,
(17)
where
p =
1
2
− 1
6cE
√
(4b + cE)(36b + 3cE − 8cL) (18)
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we can state that the equilibria BAi and BA′i exist for
BTCP < L < PFBS , (19)
where
BTCP =
6b(3b + cE)
c(4b + cE)
and PFBS =
36b + 3cE
8c
. (20)
It is easy to check that PFBS − BTCP > 0, thus the range (19) is nonempty.
Concerning the interior asymmetric (IA) equilibria
IA1 : (λ1, λ2) = (k1, 1 − 2k1) ∈ Im1, IA′1 : (λ1, λ2) = (k2, 1 − 2k2) ∈ Im1,
IA2 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − 2k1, k1) ∈ Im2, IA′2 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − 2k2, k2) ∈ Im2,
IA3 : (λ1, λ2) = (k1, k1) ∈ Im3, IA′3 : (λ1, λ2) = (k2, k2) ∈ Im3,
(21)
where k1 and k2 are given by
k1,2 =
1
cE
(
1
6
Lc − b + 1
4
cE ∓ 1
12
√
24b (42b − 10Lc + 9cE) − c2(9E(4L − E) − 4L2)
)
,
(22)
we can state that the interior asymmetric equilibria IAi, i = 1, 2, 3, exist for
BTCP < L < FIA and E > E1 ,
and the interior asymmetric equilibria IA′i exist for
BTBS < L < FIA if E > E1 or BTBS < L < BTCP if 0 < E < E1 ,
where
FIA =
3
2c
(
20b + 3cE − 2
√
2 (6b + cE)
)
, BTBS =
6b(cE + 6b)
c(8b + cE)
, E1 =
2b(7 − 5√2)
c(2
√
2 − 3) ,
(23)
and where FIA = BTCP at E = E1. Moreover, it is easy to check that FIA −
BTCP > 0 (for E = E1), FIA − BTBS > 0, and BTCP − BTBS > 0, thus, the
existence ranges of IAi and IA′i are nonempty. In the (E,L)-parameter plane
the curves deﬁned by L = FIA and L = BTCP are tangent at E = E1.
Finally, the interior symmetric (IS) equilibrium
IS : (λ1, λ2) = (1/3, 1/3)
always exists. Moreover, for a suﬃciently small γ (namely, for γ ≤ 1+ 6b/cE) it
is stable for any L > TIS = 18b+cE4c .
To illustrate the existence and stability properties of the long-run equilibria,
we choose a, b, c, η and E parameter values similar to those used in Behrens
(2004):
a = 1/3, b = 1/3, c = 1/3, η = 0, E = 1.5 . (24)
56 P. Commendatore et al.
Fig. 1. Bifurcation curves related to ﬁxed points of map Z in the (E,L)-parameter
plane for a = 1/3, b = 1/3, c = 1/3.
We ﬁx also
γ = 10, CA = 1 (25)
and vary L as in Commendatore et al. (2017).
Figure 1 summarizes the properties of the long-run equilibria. In this Figure
we plotted the bifurcation curves L = BTBS , L = BTCP , L = TIS , L = FIA and
L = PFBS in the (E,L)-parameter plane for the values of the other parameters
as in (24) and (25). Crossing these curves the properties of the equilibria change.
In Fig. 1, the blue region is related to the coexisting attracting equilibria IS
and IAi, i = 1, 2, 3, while for the parameter values belonging to the yellow region
the attracting equilibrium IS coexists with the attracting equilibria CPi. Note
that the curve FIA is meaningful for E > E1 and that the curve BTCP intersects
the curve TIS at E = 2bc =: E2.
We now study how the properties of the equilibria of the dynamic system Z
changes for a ﬁxed E < E2, for example, for E = 1.5, by increasing L:10
• For 1 < L < BTBS there are three coexisting attracting CP equilibria, and
crossing L = BTBS (when a transverse ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of
BSi, i = 1, 2, 3, occurs), the ﬁxed points BSi become repelling and the saddle
ﬁxed points IA′i are born. Figure 2a (where the curves Ω1 and Ω2 given in
(14) are also shown) depicts the case that holds for BTBS < L < TIS . In this
Figure the basins of coexisting attracting CP equilibria – representing the set
of initial conditions leading to a long-run equilibrium – are coloured red, blue
and green (for CP0, CP1 and CP2, respectively). For the interval 1 < L < TIS ,
the size of invariant local demand, represented by the number of immobile
workers (L), is ‘small’, compared with the size of demand that potentially
could shift, represented by the number of entrepreneurs (E). A small initial
advantage of one region – i.e. an initial distribution of entrepreneurs in that
10 In Commendatore et al. (2017) we have explored an alternative path considering the
case E > E2 by setting E = 5.
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region slightly larger than in the other two – leads to full agglomeration of
the industrial activity in that region: the agglomeration forces overcome the
dispersion forces.
• Crossing L = TIS (where a ‘transcritical bifurcation’ of IS occurs at which
IS = IA′i) the ﬁxed point IS becomes attracting, so that, for TIS < L <
BTCP , there are four coexisting attracting ﬁxed points, IS and CPi (see
Fig. 2b, where the basin of attraction of IS is coloured in purple). For this
interval, the increase in L is suﬃcient to make the interior equilibrium locally
stable and attracting for initial distribution of the economic activity (i.e. for
shares of entrepreneurs) not too unequal. This particular type of coexistence
cannot occur in a two-region context and it represents a novel result with
respect to Behrens (2004).
• Crossing L = BTCP (where a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ occurs) the
CP equilibria become repelling while attracting ﬁxed points IAi and saddle
ﬁxed points BAi, BA′i appear (see Fig. 2c where the basins of attraction of
IA1, IA2 and IA3 are coloured in dark yellow, brown and light blue, respec-
tively). Thus, for BTCP < L < FIA, four coexisting attracting equilibria
Fig. 2. Attracting ﬁxed points of Z (Model 1) and their basins; curves Ω1 and Ω2 given
in (14) are also shown. Here L = 4.8 in (a), L = 4.9 in (b), L = 4.92 in (c), L = 5 in
(d), and the other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
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exist: the interior symmetric (IS) equilibrium and three interior asymmetric
equilibria (IA1, IA2, IA3). In this interval, the size of immobile local demand
is suﬃciently large so that all regions can keep the industrial sector, the rel-
ative dimension of which depends on the initial condition: it could be large
for one region (as in an asymmetric equilibrium) or of equal size for all three
(as in the symmetric equilibrium).
• Crossing L = FIA (where a ‘fold bifurcation’ occurs and at which IAi = IA′i)
the ﬁxed points IAi and IA′i disappear and the only attractor of map Z
is IS (see Fig. 2d). Finally, at L = PFBS a pitchfork bifurcation of BSi
occurs (at which BSi = BAi = BA′i); after this bifurcation the ﬁxed points
BSi become saddles. Thus, for L > FIA the only stable equilbrium is the
symmetric equilibrium. The size of the immobile demand is suﬃciently large,
compared to the potentially shifting demand, so that there is scope for ﬁrms
to locate in each region. Any initial condition involving positive shares of
entrepreneurs leads to the complete dispersion of the economic activity across
the three regions as dispersion forces overcome agglomeration forces.11
Note that this model does not involve trade between the regions and for this
reason it represents a useful reference point to be compared with the other two
models in order to isolate the eﬀects of trade on the long-run distribution of the
economic activity.
6 Long-Run Equilibria Properties in Model 2
Based on the results related to the full autarky case discussed in the previous
section, we now reduce the trade costs between regions 1 and 2 allowing uni-
and bilateral trade between these regions, but not with region 3. In such a case
the indirect utilities Vi(λ1, λ2) =: Vi, i = 1, 2, 3, of an entrepreneur in regions 1,
2 and 3, respectively, are deﬁned as follows:
if λ1 ≥ λ˜, λ2 ≥ λ˜ then V1 = V no1 (λ1), V2 = V no2 (λ2),
if λ1 ≥ λ˜, λ2 < λ˜ then V1 = V out1 (λ1, λ2), V2 = V in2 (λ1, λ2),
if λ1 < λ˜, λ2 ≥ λ˜ then V1 = V in1 (λ1, λ2), V2 = V out2 (λ1, λ2),
if λ1 < λ˜, λ2 < λ˜ then V1 = V bil1 (λ1, λ2), V2 = V
bil
2 (λ1, λ2),
V3 = V no3 (λ1, λ2),
(26)
11 A further condition required for the stability of IS is L < FIIS , where
FIIS = −E(a − bη)
2(b + cE)(3γb(18b + cE) + 2 (6b + cE) (9b + cE)) + 4CAb(6b + cE)
3
12b(a − bη)2(b + cE)(6b + cE(1 − γ))
At L = FIIS the symmetric equilibrium loses stability via a ‘ﬂip bifurcation’.
Above L = FIIS cycles of diﬀerent order emerge and even complex behavior. If
γ < 1 + 6b
cE
a ﬂip bifurcation never occurs. The analysis of the case L > FIIS is
presented in Commendatore et al. (2017).
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where V inr (λ1, λ2), V
out
r (λ1, λ2), V
bil
r (λ1, λ2) for r = 1, 2 are given in Commenda-
tore et al. (2017), V no1 (λ1), V
no
2 (λ2) and V
no
3 (λ1, λ2) are deﬁned as in Model 1.
The dynamic system (or map) Z is modiﬁed accordingly.
We have examined in full detail the mathematical properties of the system Z
modiﬁed to take into account 26 in Commendatore et al. (2017). In this paper,
as for the previous model, we will focus more on the economic meaning of some
results.
In our simulations, for convenience, we set T = ab −η, that is, at the minimum
value of trade costs which ensures no trade for any distribution of entrepreneurs
across the regions, it follows
λ˜ =
2b2ε
cE(a − bη − bε)
∣
∣
∣
∣
η=0,a=b=c
=
2ε
E(1 − ε) . (27)
Moreover, we ﬁx the parameter values as in (24)–(25), and vary L and ε in the
ranges
2 < L < 9, 0 < ε < T =
a
b
− η
∣
∣
∣
a=b, η=0
= 1 .
Similarly to Model 1, the borders Ibi, i = 1, 2, 3 (see (12)) of the trapping
triangle S are invariant lines of map Z, while among the medians of S only the
main diagonal Im3 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ1 = λ2} is invariant.
The straight lines λ1 = λ˜ and λ2 = λ˜, where λ˜ is given in (27), separate the
trapping triangle S into at most four regions, each of them characterized by a
diﬀerent trade pattern (see Fig. 3a):
• the region S0 = {λ1 > λ˜, λ2 > λ˜, λ1 + λ2 < 1} corresponds to no trade;
• the regions S1 = {λ1 > λ˜, 0 < λ2 < λ˜, λ1 + λ2 < 1} and S2 = {λ2 > λ˜,
0 < λ1 < λ˜, λ1 + λ2 < 1} are related to unilateral trade;
• the region S3 = {0 < λ1 < λ˜, 0 < λ2 < λ˜} is related to bilateral trade.
It is easy to see that in the trapping triangle S there are only regions S1, S2 and
S3 (and there is no ‘no trade’ region S0) for
1
2
< λ˜ < 1 or ε2 < ε < ε3
where
ε2 =
cE(a − bη)
b(cE + 4b)
, ε3 =
cE(a − bη)
b(cE + 2b)
, (28)
and S coincides to S3 for λ˜ > 1 or ε > ε3, that is, the trapping triangle S is
associated only with bilateral trade between regions 1 and 2.12
Compared with that associated with Model 1, the map Z considered in the
present section can have more ﬁxed points/equilibria. As an example, in Fig. 3b
black, gray and white circles indicate attracting, saddle and repelling equilibria,
respectively. Below we list diﬀerent kinds of the equilibria of Model 2. Recall
that for the region S0 the results obtained for the Model 1 are valid.
12 We have obtained ε2 and ε3 by equating λ˜ to 1/2 and to 1, respectively.
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Fig. 3. In (a): Partitioning of the trapping triangle S into the regions of no trade (S0),
unilateral trade (S1 and S2) and bilateral trade (S3); In (b): Attracting, saddle and
repelling ﬁxed points of map Z are shown by black, gray and white circles, respectively;
curves Ω1 and Ω2 are shown in red and blue, respectively. Here a = b = c = 1/3, η = 0,
E = 5, L = 5.8, ε = 0.2.
The map Z keeps always all CP equilibria (see (13)) and the border sym-
metric equilibrium BS3 : (λ1, λ2) = (1/2, 1/2). Instead, the interior symmetric
equilibrium, IS : (λ1, λ2) = (1/3, 1/3) is a ﬁxed point of Z as long as IS ∈ S0,
that is, if λ˜ < 1/3. This condition corresponds to ε < ε1, where
ε1 =
cE(a − bη)
b(cE + 6b)
. (29)
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As we shall see later, the equilibrium IS may disappear,13 or it could move
to region S3. In the later case, we denote it as IA3,b, where the index ‘b’ refers
to the bilateral trade region.
On the borders Ib1 and Ib2, map Z can have also border asymmetric (BA)
equilibria:
BA1 : (λ1, λ2) = (p1, 0), BA′′1 : (λ1, λ2) = (p2, 0), BA
′
1 : (λ1, λ2) = (p3, 0) ,
BA2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, p1), BA′′2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, p2), BA
′
2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, p3) ,
where 0 < p1 < p2 < p3 < 1 are solved numerically (see Commendatore et al.
(2017)). The map Z can have, besides the CP equilibria, at most three equilibria
on each border Ibi, i = 1, 2. Note that for ε = 0 it holds that BA′′i = BSi with
p2 = 1/2.
We notice that the border asymmetric equilibria BAi, i = 1, 2, appear by
increasing L (via a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of the equilibrium CP0) at
L = BTCP0 =
6bE(a − bη)2(3b + cE)
cE (4b + cE) (a − bη)2 + (2b + cE)2 (bε)2 , (30)
and the border asymmetric equilibria BA′i, i = 1, 2, appear by increasing L (via
a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of the ﬁxed points CPi) at
L = BTCP1,2 =
6bE (a − bη)2 (3b + cE)
cE (4b + cE) (a − bη)2 − 4b2 (bε)2 . (31)
Note ﬁnally that for ε = 0 it holds BTCP0 = BTCP1,2 = BTCP , where BTCP
is deﬁned in (20).
As we shall see below an important diﬀerence in the properties of the border
asymmetric equilibria BAi and BA′i, i = 1, 2 compared to the previous model is
that, depending on parameters, they become attracting.
On the border Ib3, besides the equilibrium BS3, map Z can have four border
asymmetric (BA) equilibria:
BA3 : (λ1, λ2) = (p, 1 − p), BA′3 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − p, p) ,
BA3,u : (λ1, λ2) = (l, 1 − l), BA′3,u : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − l, l) ,
where p is given in (18), the index ‘u’ refers to the unilateral trade regions, and
λ = l, 0 < l < λ˜, is solved numerically (see Commendatore et al. (2017)).
Map Z can have also the following interior asymmetric (IA) equilibria (see
Fig. 3b):
• IAi, IA′i, i = 1, 2, 3, belonging to S0 (see (21));
13 The disappearance of the equilibrium IS after a collision with the border point
(λ1, λ2) = (λ˜, λ˜) at ε = ε1, occurs via a so-called fold border collision bifurcation
(fold BCB for short) at which IS merges with another equilibrium, also disappearing
after the bifurcation.
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• IAi,u, IA′i,u, IA′′i,u, belonging to the unilateral trade regions Si, i = 1, 2;
• IA′3,b, IA′′3,b belonging to the bilateral trade region S3.
Concerning the properties of these equilibria, we start noticing that, by
increasing L and for ε < εt, the three couples, IA1-IA′2,u, IA2-IA
′
1,u and IA3-
IA′3,b, appear simultaneously (via a ‘fold border collision bifurcation’) at
L = BCIA =
3b2ε
(
(4b − cE)(a − bε − bη) + 4b2ε)− 6b (cE + 3b) (a − bε − bη)2
c(a − bε − bη) (2b2ε − (4b + cE)(a − bε − bη)) ,
(32)
where εt corresponds to the point where the curves L = BCIA and L = FIA are
tangent (see Fig. 4b).14
Moreover, the equilibria IAi, i = 1, 2, 3, disappear merging with IA′i (due to
a ‘smooth fold bifurcation’) at L = FIA deﬁned in (23). It can be shown that
for the considered parameter values FIA − BCIA < 0, thus, the existence range
of the ﬁxed points IAi is not empty.
Note that for εt < ε < ε1 the curve L = BCIA corresponds to the collision of
the equilibria IA′i, i = 1, 2, 3, with the related borders. As L = BCIA is crossed
by increasing L, their stability properties are preserved, but not their location
as IA′1 moves to S2, IA
′
2 to S1 and IA
′
3 to S3.
15
It can be also shown that, by increasing L, the interior ﬁxed point IA′′3,b
(belonging to the median Im3) appears at L = BTCP0 given in (30) (due to a
‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of CP0); the equilibrium IA′3 is born (due to
a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of the border symmetric equilibrium BS3 at
L = BTBS) for ε < ε2. The other conditions related to the existence and/or
stability of the equilibria mentioned above can be obtained numerically, as we
discuss below.
To investigate the inﬂuence of decreasing trade cost T12 on the dynamics
of the map, we begin with ε = 0, that corresponds to Model 1, and then we
increase gradually the value of ε. Complexity of bifurcation sequences associated
with equilibria in Model 2 is caused by multistability, when up to 8 attracting
equilibria may coexist (as, e.g., in Fig. 3b), and each of them follows its own way
to appear, disappear and interact with other equilibria.
In Fig. 4a, representing the (ε, L)-parameter plane for 2 < L < 9, 0 < ε < 1
and for the other parameters ﬁxed as in (24), (25), we summarize the proper-
ties of the attracting equilibria. Figure 4b shows an enlargement of the rectangle
indicated in Fig. 4a. In these ﬁgures the parameter regions associated with dif-
ferent coexisting attracting equilibria are colored diﬀerently, being separated by
14 Note also that crossing L = BCIA by decreasing L and considering the interval
ε < εt the equilibria IA1 and IA
′
2,u collide from the opposite sides with the border
deﬁned by λ1 = λ˜, and similarly the couple IA2-IA
′
1,u collides with the border
deﬁned by λ2 = λ˜, while the couple IA3-IA
′
3,b, belonging to the diagonal Im3,
collides with the border point (λ1, λ2) = (λ˜, λ˜). These collisions occur simultaneously
because of the symmetry of Z with respect to the main diagonal.
15 Details how the curve BCIA is obtained are provided in Commendatore et al. (2017).
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Fig. 4. (a) Bifurcation structure of the (ε, L)-parameter plane for 0 < ε < 1, 2 < L < 9;
(b) an enlargement of the window indicated in (a) with regions of diﬀerent coexisting
attracting ﬁxed points. The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
various bifurcation curves. In particular, we have drawn the bifurcation lines
L = FIA, L = BTBS , L = TIS associated with Model 1, the curves L = BTCP0,
L = BTCP1,2, L = BCIA deﬁned in (30)–(32), and the straight vertical lines
ε = εi, i = 1, 2, 3, deﬁned in (28), (29). The values L = BTCP , L = PFBS
valid for ε = 0 are also marked on the vertical axis. Recall that the stability
range TIS < L < FlIS of the equilibrium IS obtained for Model 1 is suitable
for Model 2 for ε < ε1; the curve L = BTBS is valid for ε < ε2 and corresponds
to the transverse border transcritical bifurcation of the equilibrium BS3; the
curve L = FIA (related to the ‘smooth fold bifurcation’ at which IAi = IA′i,
i = 1, 2, 3) is valid for 0 < ε < εt, where (ε, L) = (εt, FIA) correspond to the
point where the curves L = FIA and L = BCIA are tangent.
In Fig. 4b the bifurcation curves separating the regions of qualitatively dif-
ferent dynamics, besides those mentioned above, are obtained numerically, in
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particular, the curve L = FBA1,2 (related to a ‘fold bifurcation’ leading, by
increasing L, to the disappearance of the couples of the border equilibria BAi-
BA′′i , i = 1, 2); and the curve L = BTBA′1,2 (associated to a so-called ‘transverse
border transcritical bifurcation’ of the border equilibria BA′i, i = 1, 2, leading,
by increasing ε, to their stabilization and to the appearance of the saddle inte-
rior equilibrium IA′i,u). Accordingly, we have marked in the largest and more
visible regions of Fig. 4b the associated attracting equilibria that coexist in those
regions (for a description of the smaller regions of coexistence, as well as other
bifurcation curves, we refer to Commendatore et al. (2017)).
Below, we present several examples for diﬀerent values of L to illustrate
the eﬀects of lowering trade costs, determined by increasing ε, on the long-run
properties of the equilibria and on the patterns of trade. Moreover, we also
provide an economic interpretation of the results.
Fig. 5. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 2) and their basins for L = 4.8 and
ε = 0.1 in (a), ε = 0.14 in (b), ε = 0.15 in (c), ε = 0.3 in (d) (see the black circles in
Fig. 4b). The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
One of the simplest scenarios is illustrated in Fig. 5 where L = 4.8 and ε = 0.1
in (a), ε = 0.14 in (b), ε = 0.15 in (c) and ε = 0.3 in (d) (the corresponding points
in the parameters space are indicated in Fig. 4b by black circles). For ε = 0 there
are three coexisting attracting CP equilibria (see Fig. 2a). When it is close to 0,
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an increase of ε does not change abruptly the qualitative properties of the system
Z (see Fig. 5a).16 Its most relevant eﬀects occur in the subregions of S related
to unilateral trade, S1 and S2,17 the basin of attraction of the equilibrium CP0
shrinks, whereas those of the equilibria CP1 (in S2) and CP2 (in S2) expand.
This implies that when the initial distribution of entrepreneurs is suﬃciently in
favour of region 1 (in S1) or 2 (in S2), all the ﬁrms move in that region enjoying
additional proﬁts obtained by selling goods in the outside market (in region 2
or 1, respectively).
An abrupt change occurs when ε crosses the curve L = BTCP0 (associated
to a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of the equilibrium CP0) involving a loss of
stability and the consequent disappearance of the basin of attraction of CP0. This
also leads to the appearance of the attracting border equilibria BAi, i = 1, 2 and
of the saddle interior equilibrium IA′′3,b in the subregion of S related to bilateral
trade, S3, so that map Z has now four attractors, CP1, CP2, BA1 and BA2 (see
Fig. 5b). Compared with the equilibrium CP0, in the equilibria BAi, i = 1, 2,
trade costs are suﬃciently low to allow for the location of some industry in region
1 (at BA1) or in region 2 (at BA2). Firms in region 1 (at BA1) and 2 (at BA2) are
enjoying additional proﬁts by selling goods in the outside market (in region 2 or
1, respectively). In region 3, the size of the local market is suﬃciently large that
a large share of ﬁrms still ﬁnds convenient to locate there. Finally, being on the
borders, the equilibria BAi, i = 1, 2 are obviously characterised by a unilateral
trade pattern, even if along the transition path towards the equilibrium regions 1
and 2 may engage in bilateral trade for distributions of entrepreneurs positioned
in S3.18
Then, when the ε crosses the curve L = FBA1,2 (and a ‘fold bifurcation’
occurs at which BAi = BA′′i ) the equilibria BA1 and BA2 disappear, and the
remaining attractors are the ﬁxed point CP1 and CP2 (see Fig. 5c). Thus for ε
suﬃciently large (for trade costs suﬃciently low) all initial distributions lead to
an equilibrium in which the industrial sector is agglomerated in region 1 (or 2).
Bilateral trade between regions 1 and 2 is possible along the transition path,
however, only unilateral trade occurs in the long-run.
For larger values of ε the equilibria CP1 and CP2 continue to be the only
attractors of map Z and the economic interpretation is the same (see Fig. 5d).19
16 Notice that the basins of CP equilibria are bounded by the closure of the stable
invariant sets of the saddle ﬁxed points BA′′1 , BA
′′
2 and IA
′
3..
17 In regions S0 and S3 the long-run results are qualitatively similar to those that
apply for the case ε = 0. For initial conditions that start in region S3 bilateral trade
occurs during the transition path towards the equilibrium CP0.
18 There are also initial conditions belonging to the region S0 which leads to BA1 or
BA2. Along the corresponding transitions path there is a switch from a no trade
regime to a unilateral trade regime.
19 Concerning the analytical properties of the map Z, when ε is increased, the repelling
ﬁxed point IS, after undergoing a ‘persistence border colision’, when the curve ε =
ε1 is crossed, disappears together with the saddle ﬁxed point IA
′
3 when the curve
L = BCIA is crossed undergoing a ‘fold BCB’ (see Fig. 5d).
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Fig. 6. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 2) and their basins for L = 4.9 and
ε = 0.1 in (a), ε = 0.15 in (b) (see the gray circles in Fig. 4b). The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
Let now set L = 4.9 and consider the cases (a) ε = 0.1 and (b) ε = 0.15 (the
corresponding points in the parameter space are indicated in Fig. 4b by grey
circles). For ε = 0 the attracting equilibrium IS coexists with three attracting
CP equilibria (see Fig. 2b). Increasing ε at ﬁrst the curve L = BTCP0 is crossed
leading to the loss of stability of CP0 and to the appearance of the attracting
border equilibria BA1 and BA2. In Fig. 6a (where ε = 0.1) these equilibria
coexist with the attracting equilibria IS, CP1 and CP2. In S0 the results are
qualitatively similar to those that apply when ε = 0: IS is still characterised
by full autarky. However, there are initial distributions located in S1 and S2
(corresponding to short-run equilibria), leading to this equilibrium, for which
unilateral trade may occur.
By further increasing ε the equilibria BA1 and BA2 disappear when the
curve L = FBA1,2 is crossed (due to a ‘fold bifurcation’). After, map Z has three
attractors, IS, CP1 and CP2 (see Fig. 6b where ε = 0.15). Then, the equilibrium
IS disappears when the curve ε = ε1 is crossed (due to a ‘fold border collision
bifurcation’),20 so that the only attractors of map Z are the equilibria CP1 and
CP2. When CP1 and CP2 are the only stable equilibria, the properties of the
system and their economic interpretation are analogous to those corresponding
to Fig. 5d.
The change in the properties of the system observed when L = 4.92 by
increasing ε is a bit more complicated. To illustrate this case, we consider the
examples: (a) ε = 0.025 and (b) ε = 0.05 (the corresponding points in the
parameter space are indicated in Fig. 4b by red circles). For ε = 0 (see Fig. 2c) the
coexisting attracting equilibria are IS and IAi, i = 1, 2, 3. If ε is increased, the
equilibria BA′1 and BA
′
2 gain stability (due to a ‘transverse border transcritical
bifurcation’) when the curve L = BTBA′1,2 is crossed. After this bifurcation,
map Z has six attracting equilibria, IS, IAi, BA′1 and BA
′
2 (see Fig. 7a where
20 Before, when the curve L = BCIA is crossed, the saddle equilibria IA
′
i, i = 1, 2, 3
undergo a ‘persistence border collision’.
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Fig. 7. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 2) and their basins for L = 4.92 and
ε = 0.025 in (a), ε = 0.05 in (b) (see the red circles in Fig. 4b). The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25). The insets show the related parts enlarged.
ε = 0.025). Again, the most important changes occur in the regions related to
unilateral trade S1 and S2, where the border equilibria BA′1 (in S1) and BA
′
2
(S2) are now attracting (the basins of attraction of BA′1 and BA
′
2 are colored in
dark yellow and dark blue, respectively). Initial distributions that for ε = 0 were
in the basins of attraction of IA2 and IA1, for ε = 0.025 belong to the basins of
BA′1 and BA
′
2, respectively. Unilateral trade gives an incentive to entrepreneurs
to locate in region 1 (for initial distributions in the basin of BA′1) or region 2
(for initial distributions in the basin of BA′2) because of the additional proﬁts
obtained by selling goods in the outside market in region 2 or region 1.
Then after a sequence of bifurcations (which includes a ‘fold border collision
bifurcation’ of IAi occurring when the curve L = BCIA is crossed, and ‘trans-
verse border transcritical bifurcations’ of BAi and BA′′i , i = 1, 2) the attracting
equilibria are IS, BA′i, BAi and IA
′′
3,b (see Fig. 7b where ε = 0.05). The most
relevant eﬀects of the increase in ε is the appearance of the stable equilibrium
IA′′3,b in the region related to bilateral trade, S3, and the disappearance of the
interior asymmetric equilibria IAi, i = 1, 2, 3. Initial distributions that were lead-
ing previously to IA1 or IA2 are now attracted respectively by BA′2 or BA
′
1.
Concerning trade patterns, it is interesting to notice that a large set of initial
distributions characterised by full autarky may lead to a long-run equilibrium
in which unilateral (BA′2 or BA
′
1) or bilateral (IA
′′
3,b) trade prevails. Moreover,
transition paths characterised by a switch from a unilateral to a bilateral trade
regime are also possible.21
Further increasing ε leads to reverse pitchfork bifurcation of IA′′3,b which
loses stability merging with saddles IS1,b and IS2,b, then the ﬁxed points CP1
and CP2 are stabilized (due to a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’, when the
21 It is also possible a transition path starting from a unilateral trade regime in which
the share of entrepreneurs are positive in all regions ending to an equilibrium, BA1
or BA2, in which unilateral trade still prevails because region 2 or region 1 is empty
of entrepreneurs.
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Fig. 8. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 2) and their basins for L = 5 and
ε = 0.1 in (a), ε = 0.2 in (b) (see the white circles in Fig. 4b). The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
curve L = BTCP1,2 is crossed), and the properties of the system and their
interpretation become qualitatively similar to those holding for the case shown
in Fig. 6a.
Further examples are shown in Fig. 8 where L = 5 and (a) ε = 0.1 and
(b) ε = 0.2 (the corresponding points in the parameter space are indicated
in Fig. 4b by white circles). For ε = 0, IS is the only stable equilibrium (see
Fig. 2d). By increasing ε at ﬁrst the curve L = BTBA′1,2 is crossed leading to
the stabilization of the equilibria BA′1 and BA
′
2 (see Fig. 8a where ε = 0.1).
BA′1 and BA
′
2 belong to the regions of S related to unilateral trade, S1 and S2,
respectively, and are characterised by a large share of ﬁrms located in region 1
or 2 obtaining additional proﬁt by selling in the outside market in region 2 or
1 and by a small share of ﬁrms located in region 3, attracted by a suﬃciently
large local market.
For this example, it is interesting to notice that transition paths are possible
starting from a bilateral trade regime in S3 or from a unilateral trade regime in
S1 or S2 ending to the equilibrium IS in S0 in which full autarky prevails. This
is favoured by a relative large proportion of immobile local demand suﬃcient to
countervail the eﬀect of trade liberalization.
Crossing the curve L = BTCP1,2 leads to the disappearance of the equilibria
BA′1 and BA
′
2 and the stabilization of the equilibria CP1 and CP2 (due to a
‘border transcritical bifurcation’). Then (due to a ‘border collision bifurcation’)
at ε = ε1 the ﬁxed point IS disappears (see Fig. 8b where ε = ε1 = 0.2) after
which the only attractors of map Z are the ﬁxed points CP1 and CP2 and the
properties of the system and their interpretation become qualitatively similar to
those holding for the case shown in Fig. 5d.
7 Long-Run Equilibria Properties in Model 3
The economy in Model 3 takes a speciﬁc ‘hub and spoke structure. Indeed, for
the third set-up we assumed that trade costs between regions 1 and 2 are always
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suﬃciently low to establish bilateral trade (for this we let T12 <
2(a−ηb)
2b+cE ), while
trade costs between regions 2 and 3 are always suﬃciently high to impede trade
(so that T23 ≥ ab − η holds). We set T12 = τ , T13 = T − ψ and T23 = T , with
T = ab − η.
The related indirect utilities Vi(λ1, λ2) =: Vi, i = 1, 2, 3, of an entrepreneur
in regions 1, 2 and 3, respectively, are deﬁned as follows:
if λ1 ≥ Λ(λ2), λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil1 , V2 = V bil2 , V3 = V bil3 ,
if λ1 ≥ Λ(λ2), λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, out1 , V2 = V bil, out2 , V3 = V bil, out3 ,
if λ1 < Λ(λ2), λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, in1 , V2 = V bil, in2 , V3 = V bil, in3 ,
if λ1 < Λ(λ2), λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, bil1 , V2 = V bil, bil2 , V3 = V bil, bil3 ,
(33)
where
λ =
2 (a − ηb − bT13)
cET13
=
2bψ
cE
(
a
b − η − ψ
) ,
Λ(λ2) = λ − λ2T13 − T12
T13
= λ − λ2
a
b − η − ψ − τ
a
b − η − ψ
,
and V bili , V
bil, out
i , V
bil, in
i , V
bil, bil
i for i = 1, 2, 3 are deﬁned in Commendatore
et al. (2017).
In the simulations we ﬁx τ = 0.5 < 2(a−ηb)2b+cE
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= 47 ≈ 0.571 , and vary
the values of parameters L and ψ, where 0 < ψ < τ = 0.5, keeping the other
parameters ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
Let the straight lines λ2 = 1− λ − λ1 and λ1 = Λ(λ2) separating the regions
associated with diﬀerent indirect utilities be denoted as C1 and C2, respectively.
These lines can be written as
C1 : λ2 = −λ1 + 1 − 2bψ
cE
(
a
b − η − ψ
)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= −λ1 + 1 − 2ψ
E(1 − ψ) ,
C2 : λ2 = −λ1
a
b − η − ψ
a
b − η − ψ − τ
+
2bψ
cE
(
a
b − η − ψ − τ
)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= −λ1 1 − ψ1 − ψ − τ +
2ψ
E (1 − ψ − τ) .
Note that the slope of C2 in the (λ1, λ2)-phase plane is larger in modulus
than the slope of C1; the lines C1 and C2 intersect the trapping triangle S if
ψ < ab − η
∣
∣
(24)
= 1 (related to λ > 0) and ψ <
(
a
b − η
)
cE
2b+cE
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= 37 (related
to λ < 1).
Depending on the parameters the straight lines C1 and C2 may separate the
trapping triangle S into at most four regions denoted Si, i = 0, 3, where region
S0 is related to no trade between regions 1 and 3, regions S1, S2 correspond
to unilateral trade from region 3 to region 1, and from region 1 to region 3,
respectively, and region S3 is associated with bilateral trade between regions 1
and 3. In fact, there are ﬁve qualitatively diﬀerent cases:
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Fig. 9. Partitioning of the trapping triangle S into the regions S0 (no trade between
regions 1 and 3), S1 (one-way trade from region 3 to region 1), S2 (one-way trade from
region 1 to region 3) and S3 (two-way trade between regions 1 and 3). Here L = 4.8,
τ = 0.5 and ψ = 0.15 in (a), ψ = 0.23 in (b) and ψ = 0.3 in (c). The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
(1) if λ = 0, that holds for ψ = 0, then S = S0, i.e., the complete trapping
triangle S is associated with no trade between the regions 1 and 3, that is,
we are back to Model 2;
(2) if 0 < λ ≤ 1 − λ∗ where λ∗ = 2bψ
cE( ab −η−ψ−τ)
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= 2ψE(1−ψ−τ) , then S =
∪2j=0Sj (see Fig. 9a), that is, in S there are ‘no trade’ and ‘unilateral trade’
regions while bilateral trade is not possible; this holds for 0 < ψ ≤ ψ1, where
ψ1 =
1
2(4b + cE)
(
(2b + cE)
(
2
(a
b
− η
)
− τ
)
−
−
√
(2b + cE)2
(
2
(a
b
− η
)
− τ
)2
− 4cE(4b + cE)
(a
b
− η
)(a
b
− η − τ
))
,
ψ1|(24) =
1 (2 + E)(2 − τ) −
√
4 (2 − τ)2 + Eτ2(4 + E)
2(4 + E)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
E=1.5, τ=0.5
≈ 0.175 ;
(3) if 1 − λ∗ < λ < 12 , then S = ∪3j=0Sj (see Fig. 9b), that is, all four types of
trade between regions 1 and 3 are possible; this occurs for ψ1 < ψ < ψ2,
where
ψ2 =
cE(a − bη)
b(4b + cE)
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
=
3
11
≈ 0.273 ;
(4) if 12 ≤ λ < 1, then S = ∪3j=1Sj (see Fig. 9c), that is, uni- and bilateral trade
are possible, but there is no ‘no trade’ region; that holds for ψ2 ≤ ψ < ψ3,
where
ψ3 =
cE(a − bη)
b(2b + cE)
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
=
3
7
≈ 0.429 ;
(5) if λ ≥ 1, that holds for ψ3 ≤ ψ ≤ τ, then S = S3.
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Similar to Models 1 and 2, for Model 3 the borders Ibi, i = 1, 2, 3 (see (12))
of the trapping triangle S are invariant lines of map Z. 22 The border equilibria
of Z are denoted BAi ∈ Ibi, with additional upper index ‘′’, or ‘′′’ to distinguish
between diﬀerent equilibria belonging to the same border.
Besides the CP equilibria (see (13)) and BA equilibria, map Z can have also
interior equilibria which we denote IAi ∈ Si.
Figure 10 summarizes the properties of the long-run equilibria. In Fig. 10a
we present the bifurcation structure of the (ψ,L)-parameter plane for 0 < ψ <
τ = 0.5, 2 < L < 9, and other parameters ﬁxed as in (24) and (25). In this
ﬁgure the regions of diﬀerent coexisting attracting equilibria are separated by
the curves L = BTCP0, L = BTCP1, L = BTCP2 obtained numerically and
related to border transcritical bifurcations of the equilibria CP0, CP1 and CP2,
respectively, as well as by the curve L = FBA2 associated with a fold bifurcation
of the border equilibria belonging to Ib2. Figure 10b shows an enlargement of
Fig. 10a.
To study the inﬂuence of decreasing trade cost T13, as a starting point we
consider the bifurcation structure observed for ψ = 0, which is associated with
Model 2 and corresponds to the cross-section at ε = 0.5 of the (ε, L)-parameter
plane shown in Fig. 4a (recall that for Model 3 it holds that T12 = τ, while for
Model 2 T12 = ab − η − ε, so ε = ab − η − τ ; for the considered parameter values
τ = 0.5 corresponds to ε = 0.5). Below we comment several transformations
of the basins of the attracting equilibria of map Z observed for ﬁxed L = 4.8,
L = 4.92, L = 5 and increasing ψ, when various bifurcation curves are crossed.
Fig. 10. (a) Bifurcation structure of the (ψ,L)-parameter plane for 0 < ψ < 0.5,
2 < L < 9, τ = 0.5; (b) an enlargement of the window indicated in (a) with regions of
diﬀerent coexisting attracting ﬁxed points. The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24)
and (25).
22 However, for the third model map Z has no symmetry, and on each border Ibi it is
reduced to a diﬀerent 1D map. In Commendatore et al. (2017), we have seen that
for model 1 and model 2 map Z is reduced on the borders Ib1 and Ib2 to the same
1D map, while on Ib3 the 1D map is symmetric with respect to x = 1/2..
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Let L = 4.8. For ψ = 0 map Z has attracting equilibria CP1 and CP2
(see the parameter point (ε, L) = (0.5, 4.8) in Fig. 4a, which belongs to the
region denoted CP1,2). For increasing ψ these equilibria at ﬁrst remain the only
attractors of map Z: in Fig. 11a (where ψ = 0.15) we show the basins of CP1 and
CP2 separated by the closure of stable invariant sets of the saddle ﬁxed points
IA0 ∈ S0 and BA′′3 ∈ Ib3, and in Fig. 11b where ψ = 0.3 the basins are separated
by the closure of the stable invariant set of BA′′3 . What can be noticed from
Figs. 11a and b is the progressive enlargement of the basin of attraction of CP1,
and the shrinking of that of CP2, compared with the case ψ = 0, as unilateral
trade from 1 to 3 is allowed and ﬁrms in 1 could obtain additional proﬁts by
exporting goods in 3 exploiting their location. Indeed, in correspondence of CP1
one-way trade from 1 to 2 and from 1 to 3 occurs; instead, in CP2 only one way
trade from 2 to 1 can take place. Interestingly, there are possible transition paths
in which diﬀerent trade patterns may occur, for example (looking at Fig. 11b)
bilateral trade between 1 and 2 and 1 and 3 may occur for distributions of
entrepreneurs in the partition S3. However, at some point trade links are severed
as all the industrial activity agglomerates in only one region.
Fig. 11. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 3) and their basins for L = 4.8,
τ = 0.5 and ψ = 0.15 in (a), ψ = 0.3 in (b), ψ = 0.47 in (c), ψ = 0.5 in (d). The other
parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
A qualitative change is observed at ψ ≈ 0.469 as the curve L = FBA2 is
crossed, see Fig. 10b (giving rise to a ‘fold bifurcation’) and a couple of border
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equilibria, attracting BA2 and saddle BA′′2 , appear. These are shown in Fig. 11c
where basins of the attracting equilibria CP1, CP2 and BA2 are plotted for
ψ = 0.47. Recall that for ψ > ψ3 ≈ 0.43, it holds that S = S3, that is, trade costs
are suﬃciently small that bilateral trade between 1 and 3 always occur for all
distributions of entrepreneurs within S. The equilibrium BA2 is quite interesting,
since it is characterized by trade from 2 to 1 and from 3 to 1. Thus, initial
distributions of entrepreneurs that largely favour region 3 lead to a long-run
equilibrium where the hub region has no manufacturing sector and it is importing
from the two spoke regions. By further increasing ψ the curve L = BTCP0 is
crossed, and as a result the ﬁxed point BA2 disappears merging with the ﬁxed
point CP0 that gains stability (due to a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’, see
Fig. 11d where the basins of CP1, CP2 and CP3 are shown for ψ = 0.5). The
economic interpretation is that when trade costs between 1 and 3 become close
to that between 1 and 2, regions 2 and 3 become more symmetric and the basins
of attraction of the CP equilibria CP2 and CP3 are similar: initial distributions
of entrepreneurs that favour region 2 or region 3, that is one of the spoke regions,
lead to CP2 or CP3, respectively. Notice also that the basin of attraction of CP1
is much larger being region 1 the hub.
Fig. 12. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 3) and their basins for L = 4.92,
τ = 0.5 and ψ = 0.15 in (a), ψ = 0.3 in (b), ψ = 0.49 in (c), ψ = 0.5 in (d). The other
parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
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For L = 4.92 the sequence of bifurcations at ﬁrst is similar to the one
described above: Starting from the attracting ﬁxed points CP1 and CP2 coexist-
ing for ψ = 0 (the parameter point (ε, L) = (0.5, 4.92) in Fig. 4a also belongs to
the region CP1,2, as in the previous example), by increasing ψ these ﬁxed points
remain the only attractors (see Fig. 12a and b where ψ = 0.15 and ψ = 0.3,
respectively). As before it is possible to observe a progressive change in the size
of the basins of attraction of CP1 (enlarging) and CP2 (shrinking). By further
increasing ψ (after a ‘fold bifurcation’) a border attracting equilibrium BA2
and a saddle equilibrium BA′′2 are born (see Fig. 12c where ψ = 0.49). Com-
paring Figs. 11c and 12c, we see that, by increasing the immobile local demand
L (intensifying the dispersion forces), BA2 is characterised by a larger share
of entrepreneurs located in region 2 (a smaller share located in region 3) and
by a larger basin of attraction. Finally, by further increasing ψ the ﬁxed point
CP2 loses stability and the stable border equilibrium BA′2 is born (via a ‘border
transcritical bifurcation’, see Fig. 12d where ψ = 0.5). As before, by reducing
trade costs between regions 1 and 3, regions 2 and 3 become more symmetric;
diﬀerently from the previous case the larger immobile local demand allows for
some entrepreneurs located in 2 (in BA2) or in 3 (BA′2). Both BA2 and BA
′
2
are characterised by one-way trade from the spokes to the hub.
When L = 5, as for the previous cases, the attracting equilibria CP1 and
CP2 coexist for ψ = 0. By increasing ψ, after crossing the curve L = BTCP2 (see
Fig. 10b), the ﬁxed point CP2 loses stability and a border attracting equilibria
BA′2 is born. Thus, as shown in Fig. 13a, where ψ = 0.48, compared with the
previous case (see Fig. 12b) the increase in L, allows for the location of some
entrepreneurs in region 3 (CP2 has lost stability in favour of BA′2). Further
increasing ψ, leads (via a ‘fold bifurcation’) to a border attracting and a saddle
equilibria BA2 and BA′′2 (see Fig. 13b where ψ = 0.5). Compared with the
previous case, due to a larger L, this occurs for a lower value of ψ.
Fig. 13. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 3) and their basins for L = 5, τ = 0.5
and ψ = 0.48 in (a), ψ = 0.5 in (b). The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
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To clarify better the importance of the size of immobile local demand (L)
relative to the demand that could potentially shift (E), let us comment one
more sequence of transformations of the basins observed for E = 5. We ﬁx
τ = 0.2 < 2(a−ηb)2b+cE
∣
∣
∣ ≈ 0.286, L = 4.8 and will increase ψ. As before, for ψ = 0
map Z has two coexisting attracting equilibria CP1 and CP2. At ﬁrst these
equilibria remain the only attractors of Z (see Fig. 14a and 14b where ψ = 0.4
and ψ = 0.55, respectively), the qualitative behaviour of the system and its
Fig. 14. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 3) and their basins for E = 5,
L = 4.8, τ = 0.2 and ψ = 0.4 in (a), ψ = 0.55 in (b), ψ = 0.62 in (c), ψ = 0.75 in (d),
ψ = 0.779 in (e), ψ = 0.8 in (f). The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
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economic interpretation are the same as before: compared with the case ψ = 0,
ﬁrms in region 1 (the hub) take advantage of the trade opening towards region
3 (one of the spokes), this leads to higher indirect utilities for the entrepreneurs
located in 1 and to the progressive enlargement of the basin of attraction of CP1
and the shrinking of that of CP2. Then, by increasing ψ, an attracting and a
saddle equilibria BA1 and BA′′1 belonging to the border Ib1 appear (via a ‘fold
bifurcation’, see Fig. 14c where ψ = 0.62). The ﬁxed point BA1 is positioned in
the partition S1: the possibility of one-way trade from 3 to 1 allows for a long-
run equilibrium where entrepreneurs are distributed between regions 1 and 3 and
trade goes from 3 to 1 and from 1 to 2 (one-way trade to region 2 compensates for
the stronger competition in the local market from ﬁrms located in 3, attracting
some of the entrepreneurs to region 1).
If ψ is further increased, this leads to the appearance of a border attract-
ing equilibrium BA3 ∈ Ib3 (via a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of CP2, see
Fig. 14d where ψ = 0.75), which mirrors BA1. Indeed, reducing trade costs
between 1 and 3 makes regions 2 and 3 more symmetric (while partition S3
completely overlaps with S): In BA3 (symmetrically with respect to BA1) entre-
preneurs are distributed between regions 1 and 2 and trade goes from 2 to 1 and
from 1 to 3.
By further increasing ψ, at ﬁrst the couple BA1 - BA′′1 disappears (see
Fig. 14e where ψ = 0.779), and then the couple BA3 - BA′′3 disappears (both
via a ‘fold bifurcation). After these bifurcations the ﬁxed point CP1 is a unique
attractor of Z (see Fig. 14f where ψ = 0.8). Due to the relatively small ratio
L/E the agglomeration forces are much stronger than in the previous examples,
thus due to the central position, region 1 attracts all entrepreneurs, with the
exception of the initial conditions in the basin of attraction of BA3 in Fig. 14e
or for all the initial conditions in the interior of S in Fig. 14f.
8 Final Remarks
In this paper we presented a basic analytic framework representing a small trade
network whose main objectives were: (i) highlight how distance may aﬀect the
formation of trade links and their direction; (ii) examine the long-term con-
sequences of trade integration on the emergence/disappearance of trade links
and on the distribution of economic activities across space; (iii) explore how
the spatial distribution of economic activities and the existence of trade links
are interrelated. Given the large number of possible trade structures, we only
considered three examples, representing three frequently realized patterns in the
EU trade network (see Basile et al. (2016)) and we provided three respective
models.
Some of our results are: For the ﬁrst model, dealing with three autarkic
regions, we found cases of coexistence of long-run equilibria which are absent
in a two-region context (see Behrens (2004)); for the second model, when only
region 1 and 2 trade with each other, we conﬁrmed Behrens (2005) result that
allowing for unilateral trade favours the region endowed with the higher initial
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distribution of entrepreneurs, however given the presence of a third region, not
necessarily all entrepreneurs agglomerate in the region with the better initial
endowment. Finally, for the third model, we found that, notwithstanding the
diﬀerent geography assumed, for some parameter combinations, the result of
Ago et al. (2006) according to which centrality could translate into a locational
disadvantage, is conﬁrmed.
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Appendix
For Model 3 the indirect utilities are deﬁned as follows:
if λ1 ≥ Λ(λ2), λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil1 , V2 = V bil2 , V3 = V bil3 ,
if λ1 ≥ Λ(λ2), λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, out1 , V2 = V bil, out2 , V3 = V bil, out3 ,
if λ1 < Λ(λ2), λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, in1 , V2 = V bil, in2 , V3 = V bil, in3 ,
if λ1 < Λ(λ2), λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, bil1 , V2 = V bil, bil2 , V3 = V bil, bil3 ,
where
λ =
2 (a − ηb − bT13)
cET13
, Λ(λ2) = λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2,
V bil1 = (θ1T12 + ψ1)T12 + ω + CA, V
bil
2 = (θ2T12 + ψ2)T12 + ω + CA,
θ1 =
(b + cE)
(
4
[
cλ2E(2b + cλ2E) + 2b2
]
L + 3λ2EΔ1
)
24 [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
Δ1 = cE[cE(λ1 + λ2)(λ1 + 2λ2) + 4b(λ1 + 3λ2)] + 12b2,
ψ1 = − (a − ηb)(b + cE) [3λ2E(3b + 2cλ2E) + 2bL]
3 [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
ψ2 = − (a − ηb)(b + cE) [3λ1E(3b + 2cλ1E) + 2bL]
3 [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
ω =
(a − ηb)2(b + cE) (4bL + 3E(λ1 + λ2)[3b + cE(λ1 + λ2)])
6b [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
θ2 =
(b + cE)
(
4
[
cλ1E(2b + cλ1E) + 2b2
]
L + 3λ1EΔ2
)
24 [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
Δ2 = cE[cE(λ1 + λ2)(λ2 + 2λ1) + 4b(λ2 + 3λ1)] + 12b2,
V bil3 = V
no
3 =
(a − η)2(b + cE)[3λ3E(3b + cλ3E) + 2bL]
6b(2b + cλ3E)2
+ CA,
V bil, out1 = V
bil
1 + Π
out
13 ,
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Πout13 = (b+ cE)
[
a − ηb − [cE(1 − λ1 − λ2) + 2b] T132
2b + c(1 − λ2)E
]2 [
L
3
+ (1 − λ1 − λ2)E
]
,
V bil, out2 = V
bil
2 ,
V bil, out3 = (f3T13 + g3)T13 + h3 + CA,
f3 =
λ1E(b + cE)
(
cE [12b(1 − λ2) + 2cλ1L + 3cE(1 − λ1 − λ2)(1 + 2λ1 − λ2)] + 12b2
)
24 [2b + cE(1 − λ2)]2
,
g3 =
3λ1E(a − ηb)(b + cE)(cL3 − b − cλ1E)
3 [2b + cE(1 − λ2)]2
,
h3 =
3(a − ηb)2(b + cE)
(
cE2(1 − λ2)2 + b[2L3 + E(3 − 2λ1 − 3λ2)]
)
6b [2b + cE(1 − λ2)]2
,
V bil, in1 = S
bil, in
1 + Π
bil, in
11 + Π
bil, in
12 + CA,
Sbil, in1 =
λ2Q1T12 + Q2(1 − λ1 − λ2)T13 + Q3
8(2b + cE)2
(b + cE)E,
Q1 = T12
(
cE[cE(1 − λ2) + 4b] + 4b2
)− 8(b + cE)(a − ηb) − 2c2E2(1 − λ1 − λ2)T13,
Q2 = [c
2E2(λ1 + λ2) + 4b(b + cE)]T13 − 8(b + cE)(a − ηb), Q3 = 4(a − ηb)
2(b + cE)
b
,
Πbil, in11 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb + [(1 − λ1 − λ2)T132 + T122 λ2
]
cE
2b + cE
]2 (
L
3
+ λ1E
)
,
Πbil, in12 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb − T122 (2b + cλ2E)
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
]2 (
L
3
+ λ2E
)
,
V bil, in2 = S
bil
2 + Π
bil, in
21 + Π
bil
22 + CA,
Sbil2 =
λ1ΩT12 + Ψ
8[2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]2
(b + cE)E,
Ω = T12
{
cE(λ1 + λ2)[cEλ2 + 4b] + 4b2
} − 8[b + cE(λ1 + λ2)](a − ηb) ,
Ψ =
4(a − ηb)2(λ1 + λ2)[b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
b
,
Πbil, in21 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb + cE(1 − λ1 − λ2)T132 − T122 [cE(1 − λ2) + 2b]
2b + cE
]2 (
L
3
+ λ1E
)
,
Πbil22 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb + T12
2
cλ1E
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
]2 (
L
3
+ λ2E
)
,
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V bil, in3 = V
no
3 + Π
bil, in
31 ,
Πbil, in31 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb + cEλ2 T122 − T132 [cE(λ1 + λ2) + 2b]
2b + cE
]2 (
L
3
+ λ1E
)
,
V bil, bil1 = V
bil, in
1 + Π
out
13 , V
bil, bil
2 = V
bil, in
2 , V
bil, bil
3 = V
bil, out
3 + Π
bil, in
31 .
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